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Infertility is a life-altering diagnosis. With few exceptions, it
is not a diagnosis that surprises an individual at a yearly physical
exam; rather, it comes after months of failed attempts to conceive
a child. The medical community defines infertility as the inability
of a woman to conceive after "one year [or more] of unprotected,
well-timed [sexual] intercourse."' Inherent in the medical
definition are months of loss, dashed expectations, and the
emotional turmoil that results from attempting to have a child and
failing.
Faced with the high costs of medical care and the possibility
of not having children, women and couples have turned to
insurance as a means to pay for increasingly expensive assisted
reproductive technology (ART).2 These treatments have relatively
low success rates, meaning that women often maximize the use of
their health insurance to pay for repeated and unsuccessful
attempts at achieving pregnancy. 3 Many employers, attempting to
cut costs, have excluded infertility treatments from their
insurance plans and have placed limits on the amount of leave
employees can use to receive treatments. 4  Women have
challenged these exclusions as a form of employer sex
discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA), an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
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1. RESOLVE, What Is Infertility?, http://www.resolve.orgtsitefPageServer?
pagename=lrn -wii-home (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
2. KAREY HARWOOD, THE INFERTILITY TREADMILL: FEMINIST ETHICS,
PERSONAL CHOICE, AND THE USE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 42 (2007).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 20.
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(Title VII). 5
While holding that such exclusions are impermissible offers
some measure of relief for individual women, it also has the
impact of increasing employers' costs for hiring women as a group.
This dichotomy presents the question of whether individual gains
are worth the price incurred by all women. The alignment of
infertility exclusions with pregnancy discrimination harms
feminist goals of improving women's roles, participation, and
status in the workforce. Additionally, neither the legislative
intent in passing the PDA nor Supreme Court jurisprudence offer
significant support for the argument that infertility exclusions are
analogous to pregnancy discrimination.
This Article argues that such infertility exclusions do not
constitute sex discrimination. Requiring employers to pay for
highly unsuccessful and expensive infertility treatments will lead
to negative, albeit illegal, responses to the hiring of women,
thereby diminishing the footholds that women have gained in the
labor force. Further, requiring employers pay for ART will
perpetuate the assumption by women that they can delay
childbearing almost indefinitely to focus on their careers. These
incorrect assumptions will weaken the demand for workplace
policies that truly allow women to sustain both family and career
goals. Finally, the alignment of infertility exclusions with
pregnancy discrimination reinvigorates societal perceptions of a
woman's childbearing capacity as the measure of her worth, as if
to deny her every infinitesimal opportunity to bear children is
robbing her of her very essence. As a result, while individual
women may gain from the alignment of infertility exclusions with
sex discrimination, women as a group are harmed by such
characterizations.
Part I of this Article explains the nature of infertility and the
range of current medical treatments available. In particular, this
Part details how costly and relatively ineffective ART is in
resolving infertility since the leading factor in infertility is the
advanced age of women. Part II details feminist legal theories,
illustrating how the prevailing legal approach to sex
discrimination during the 1970s-the equality model-resulted in
specific legislation to address pregnancy. This Part discusses the
primary motivation for passing the PDA, which was not to elevate
pregnancy to its own level of legal protection, but to protect women
from adverse job actions based on pregnancy-a primary cause of
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). For the full text of the Act, see infra note 59.
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women's departure from the workforce. Part III details the history
of sex discrimination jurisprudence prior to the PDA and
highlights the doctrinal gap that operated to the disadvantage of
women on the issue of pregnancy. Part IV explains the PDA and
how Congress acted to cure that doctrinal gap. Part V delineates
the Supreme Court's interpretations of the PDA and demonstrates
how the Court has adopted a "dominance" approach to interpreting
sex discrimination. This approach evaluates how a policy impacts
women in the labor market to determine if the policy is
permissible. Finally, Part VI of this Article discusses the
applicability of the PDA to infertility exclusions under the
dominance approach. This Part explains how determining that
infertility exclusions constitute sex discrimination does not
improve equality for women workers.
I. Infertility and Insurance Coverage
The medical community has worked steadily on treatment for
infertility since the first report of in vitro fertilization of a human
egg in 1944.6 In the United States after World War II, individuals
regarded science as preeminent, and once the federal government
began funding research and development, advances in infertility
treatment saw exponential growth. 7 The pronatalist sentiment of
the post-war era created the complementary demand for infertility
treatments as well.8 Primary motivators of the era's pronatalism
were a societal desire to push women back to the domestic
sphere-thereby vacating jobs for returning male soldiers to fill-
and a desire to reassure "issues of male identity and cultural
anxieties."9
Today, infertility affects one in seven U.S. adults.10 While
there are many causes of infertility, "the single most important
determinant of a couple's fertility is the age of the female
partner."1 1  A woman's fertility peaks around age twenty-seven
and sharply declines after age thirty-five.1 2  There is an
6. MARGARET MARSH & WANDA RONNER, THE EMPTY CRADLE: INFERTILITY IN
AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 171 (1996).
7. Id. at 181-82.
8. Id. at 183-85.
9. Id. at 185.
10. LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: How ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS
CHANGING MEN, WOMEN, AND THE WORLD 10 (2007).
11. ADAM H. BALEN & HOWARD S. JACOBS, INFERTILITY IN PRACTICE 3 (2d ed.
2003).
12. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 15 (2006).
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"inescapable correlation between fertility and youth."' 3
Other leading causes of female infertility are endometriosis,
fibroids, tubal scarring, and ovulation problems most often caused
by advanced age.14  Endometriosis, while also causing pelvic
pain, 15 primarily causes infertility due to pelvic deformity.16 Pelvic
deformity occurs when "bits of the uterine lining ... slough off and
block the fallopian tubes."' 7 Fibroids prevent implantation of an
embryo due to the distortions they can cause in the uterus.' 8
Tubal scarring is the result of pelvic infection, often from sexually
transmitted diseases or childbirth. 9  While some ovulation
problems-such as a woman born without ovaries or with hormone
imbalances-are tied to physiology, increasingly, "ovulatory
disorders are linked directly to age."20 Medical interventions for
female infertility range from minor-including hormone
medication to improve ovulation 2' and surgery to remove fibroids 22
and treat endometriosis23-to the most advanced and expensive
treatment of in vitro fertilization, for which doctors create embryos
in a lab and implant them in a woman's womb. 24
Male infertility is due to problems with sperm, either
defective sperm from infection or genetics, 25 or mechanical
difficulties in ejaculating sperm.26 Aside from replacing sperm
through the use of donor sperm,27 treatments have centered on
"enhancing sperm quality in vitro rather than treating the
underlying dysfunction. '28 Methods of gathering viable sperm
include working with a sample of ejaculate or, in the case of men
who are unable to ejaculate, through methods such as
electroejaculation 29 or sperm aspiration.30
13. Id.
14. Id. at 14-15.
15. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 237.
16. Id. at 239.
17. SPAR, supra note 12, at 14.
18. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 266.
19. MUNDY, supra note 10, at 27.
20. SPAR, supra note 12, at 15.
21. MUNDY, supra note 10, at 25.
22. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 266-67.
23. Id. at 237.
24. Id. at 317-32.
25. The nature of sperm defects can range from low motility, a condition where
they lack the ability to penetrate an egg, to misshapenness. MUNDY, supra note 10,
at 68.
26. See BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 273-95.
27. Id. at 291-95.
28. Id. at 273.
29. Id. at 289.
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Several medical interventions can treat infertility without
removing the underlying cause, and doctors generally use these
interventions in cases of unexplained infertility. 31  These
procedures, called ART, are "all treatments or procedures that
involve surgically removing eggs from a woman's ovaries and
combining the eggs with sperm to help a woman become
pregnant."32 These include gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT),
in vitro fertilization (IVF), and zygote intrafallopian transfer
(ZIFT).33 The most advanced and expensive form of infertility
treatment is IVF.34 The average cost of one cycle of IVF ranges
from $10,000 to $15,000. 35
Only eleven states mandate some form of insurance coverage
for infertility: Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
and West Virginia.3 6  Insurance coverage for infertility is
voluntary in all other states. However, even in the states where
coverage is mandatory, many couples-such as those who are not
married,3 7 couples who have not been infertile for the requisite
period of time,38 gay and lesbian couples, 39 couples not covered by
30. MUNDY, supra note 10, at 73-74.
31. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 302.
32. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION ET AL., 1997 ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 383 (1999), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ArchivedARTPDFs/97art.pdf.
33. Id. at 10-11. GIFT is a process whereby the ova and sperm are mixed in a
petri dish and then placed in the fallopian tubes so that fertilization and
implantation can occur. Id. IVF is the process whereby fertilization happens in a
lab and the resulting embryos are placed in a woman for implantation. Id. ZIFT is
a process whereby doctors place an egg, fertilized outside the body, into a woman's
fallopian tubes. Id.
34. Barbara Collura, The Costs of Infertility Treatment, RESOLVE,
http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn mtacost (last visited Nov.
4, 2009). IVF is the most common form of ART. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, supra note 32, at 10.
35. Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits, 80 U. COLO. L.
REV. 127, 160 (2009).
36. Id. at 183-84 & n.221.
37. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810
(LexisNexis 2008).
38. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West 2007) (requiring that couples
have been unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy during a one-year period);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:1OA-116.5 (requiring a "history of infertility of at least five
years' duration"); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 51356m (West 2007) (requiring that
couples have been unable to conceive after one year); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810
(requiring infertility of at least two years' duration); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §
47H and ch. 176B, § 4J (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring that couples have been unable
to conceive during a period of one year); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48A-7w (West 2008)
(requiring that couples have been unable to conceive after two years if the female
partner is under thirty-five; after one year if the female partner is thirty-five or
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HMOs,40 women over or under a certain age cap,4' or women who
have surpassed the allotted number of TVF attempts42-do not
meet the guidelines for mandatory coverage.
These limits on coverage imply more than just social policy
norms about who should become parents. The reality of the
current healthcare market, absent government subsidization, is
that "in an era of managed care, infertility treatments are
subjected to cost-benefit analysis and the scrutiny that comes with
trying to determine the legitimacy and priority of a given
treatment when not all treatments can be covered." 43 Limitations
based on age, number of attempts, and demonstration of infertility
for a requisite amount of time surely reflect a concern of
diminishing returns, particularly because a woman's conception
rates decrease as she ages during the course of treatment. 44
Additionally, the moral hazard of women and couples continuing
to choose IVF, despite the indication that it will not be successful,
leads to an actuarial decision on the part of states not to force
employers to pay for endless and unsuccessful treatments. 45
Research has shown that women facing infertility will utilize ART
as long as they can financially afford to do so, 46 proving that
insurance coverage distorts the market for such services.47
II. Feminist Legal Theory
Most scholars regard the field of feminist legal theory to have
begun in the 1970s.48  For decades prior, "separate spheres"
older); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23, 27-41-33 (2008) (requiring that
couples have been unable to conceive during a period of one year).
39. See id. Laws requiring demonstrated infertility of a certain period exclude
gay and lesbian couples. In addition, several states require all IVF to be performed
with a spouse's sperm, thereby excluding gay and lesbian couples. HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 431:10A-116.5; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810.
40. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25A-2 (LexisNexis 2007).
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (must be younger than forty years old);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48A-7w (must be forty-five years old or younger); N.Y. INS.
LAW § 3221 (McKinney 2007) (must be between twenty-one and forty-four years
old); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-41-33, 27-19-23 (2007) (must be between
twenty-five and forty-two years old).
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m (West
2007); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48A-7w.
43. HARWOOD, supra note 2, at 42.
44. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 3.
45. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 335 (1992) (discussing the moral hazard of
insurance related to pregnancy),
46. HARWOOD, supra note 2, at 76-77.
47. See EPSTEIN, supra note 45.
48. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 23 (2d ed.
[Vol. 28:163
Infertile Grounds
ideology characterized the legal analysis of women and held, as a
matter of law, that as men and women were different, the law
could treat them differently.49 The most well-known articulation
of this ideology is that of Justice Bradley in his 1873 concurrence
in Bradwell v. Illinois,50 stating that the "paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother."51  Separate spheres ideology was the basis for
upholding a range of so-called protective legislation, such as
barring women from the legal profession, 52 limiting the number of
hours women could work,53 and, even as late as the 1960s,
exempting women from jury duty.54  Judges and lawmakers
accepted these pronatalist policies-policies that funneled women
out of the labor market and into domestic life-since the dominant
ideology explained women's roles as a result of biological
differences between the sexes and not of sexist thinking.55
Feminists, in addressing the subjugation of women in society,
sought a means to challenge workplace discrimination and were
successful in promoting equality-based legal theories and
legislation.56 Feminists lobbied Congress to pass specific bills
designed to remedy discrimination based on sex 57-such as the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 5 8 -and to add sex to other civil rights
legislation aimed at remedying race discrimination-such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.59 By linking the struggle for sex equality
2003).
49. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER
15-16 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds,, 1991).
50. 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (Bradley, J. concurring).
51. Id. at 141.
52. Id.
53. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
54. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975). The Court stated that "woman is still regarded as the center of
home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a
State .. .to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civil duty of jury
service...." Id. at 62.
55. CHAMALLAS, supra note 48, at 25.
56. Id. at 26-27.
57. Id. at 24.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
59. See Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 164-65 (1991); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (2006). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it
an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
2010]
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to that of racial equality, feminists sought to improve the legal
status of women. 60
Feminists argued that "[d]ifferences among men and
differences among women were as significant as the differences
between men and women."61  The overall goal of the feminist
movement, however, was not simply to have men and women
treated exactly the same. Rather, the goal was to give women
what men had-"a chance at productive lives of reasonable
physical security, self-expression, individuation, and minimal
respect and dignity."62
This equality-based approach, however, failed when applied
to pregnancy because the fact that women could carry children and
men could not was the "centerpiece, the linchpin, the essential
feature of women's separate sphere."63  As a result of this
biological difference, the Supreme Court held that pregnancy
classifications did not violate constitutional equal protection
principles or Title VII.64 Given the severe consequences of
pregnancy for working women, feminists lobbied Congress to
amend the Civil Rights Act through the PDA65 so as to statutorily
define pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination. 66
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. In cases applying the Act to employer decisions based on pregnancy prior to the
amendment of the PDA, the Supreme Court found such practices did not constitute
sex discrimination. See infra notes 80-104 and accompanying text.
60. CHAMALLAS, supra note 48, at 23 (noting that the "basic strategy was to
analogize unequal or discriminatory treatment of women to racial discrimination.").
61. Id. at 30.
62. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex
Discrimination, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER, supra
note 49, at 81.
63. Williams, supra note 49, at 22. Williams further comments that "[t]he
stereotypes, the generalizations, the role expectations were at their zenith when a
woman became pregnant." Id.
64. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). The PDA inserted section k into the existing
Civil Rights Act. Section k provides:
[The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work ....
Id.
66. Williams, supra note 49, at 25. Some feminists have referred to the PDA as
a "doctrinal embarrassment" since it highlights the failure of the equality approach
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Therefore, the primary goal in the promotion and passage of the
PDA was to fill a gap created by equality-based legislation that left
women vulnerable to subjugation in the labor market.
As Parts III, IV, and V will demonstrate, the passage of the
PDA represents an evolution from an approach to women's rights
based on pure equality to one based on the dominance approach.67
This approach asks what women need to make them equal
competitors to men in the labor market and allows for some special
treatment, if such treatment "would help to lessen women's
oppression. '6 The Supreme Court has embraced this approach to
interpreting the PDA, allowing states to offer pregnant women
greater benefits than similarly situated men.69
The dominance approach is the correct way to interpret the
PDA since the ultimate goal of the legislation was to alleviate the
subjugation of women in the labor market. Thus, mandating
employer-subsidized infertility coverage is a reversion to the
pronatalist sentiment of the post-war era70 and will result in the
increased subordination of women in the labor force.
III. Sex Discrimination Prior to the PDA
Two significant Supreme Court cases exemplify the judicial
treatment of pregnancy under the equality model of sex
discrimination prior to the PDA. Each of these cases evaluated
whether pregnancy exclusions in insurance plans were
permissible. Both times, the Supreme Court found these plans
permissible, despite clear and obvious disadvantages to women in
the labor force.
A. Geduldig v. Aiello71
The first significant case examining pregnancy exclusions
was a 1974 constitutional challenge to a California disability
program that excluded pregnancy as a covered event.72 The
to capture the full nature of women's subordination. See MacKinnon, supra note
62, at 86.
67. See SALLY KENNEY, FOR WHOSE PROTECTION?: REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS
AND EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN 155 (1992);
MacKinnon, supra note 62, at 89.
68. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 155.
69. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
70. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
71. 417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, as recognized in Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985).
72. Id. at 486.
20101
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plaintiffs argued that the exclusion of coverage for pregnancy was
sex discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection clause.7 3 Even though the Supreme Court had
begun to apply heightened scrutiny to distinctions involving sex,74
the Court had previously held that more rigorous scrutiny was not
called for when the policies turned on actual differences between
men and women. 75
In its application of heightened scrutiny, the Court "drew the
line at pregnancy."76 The Court summed up its logic in a footnote:
"The program divides potential recipients into two groups-
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons."77 Since both groups
contain women, the Court determined that such a classification
could not be sex-based. 78
B. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert79
The next case considering pregnancy classifications
addressed statutory definitions of sex discrimination.8 0 Title VII
created a cause of action for sex discrimination that applied to
state, federal, and private employers.8 1  Supreme Court
interpretation of the legislation, now codified in the law, has
evinced two separate ways for plaintiffs to challenge the actions of
an employer related to sex. The first is a disparate treatment
analysis where an employer who creates policies that expressly
distinguish between men and women faces liability unless the
categorization is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).82
The BFOQ defense is an "extremely narrow exception to the
general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex," 8 3
73. Id. at 486-87.
74. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (noting that a mandatory
preference for men over women as the administrators of estates under state law
was arbitrary and not justified); see also KENNEY, supra note 67, at 164-69
(discussing the level of scrutiny applied to sex discrimination in Equal Protection
cases).
75. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
76. Williams, supra note 49, at 22.
77. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20.
78. Id.
79. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, as recognized in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962
(2009).
80. Id. at 133.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) ("[A] bona fide occupational qualification [is one]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise....").
83. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
[Vol. 28:163
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whereby the classification is "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise."8 4 It is difficult
for an employer to prevail on these grounds.
The Supreme Court, however, also broadened the scope of
impermissible conduct under Title VII to include those facially
neutral practices that had a discriminatory impact on a protected
group.8 5 An employer must demonstrate a business necessity for
these practices in order to avoid liability for a disparate impact.
8 6
The business necessity defense is a broader exception than that of
a BFOQ, making it easier for an employer to avoid liability.8 7
However, a plaintiff need not show that the employer acted with
discriminatory intent to prevail on a discrimination claim under
the disparate impact theory.8 8
In Gilbert, the Court considered a disability program that
excluded pregnancy as a covered condition to evaluate whether
such a classification constituted sex discrimination.8 9 The Court
imputed the Geduldig logic of pregnant and non-pregnant
persons. 90 Based on the lack of legislative history related to sex
discrimination, the Court ruled that Congress, in passing Title
VII, had not intended to overrule its reasoning in Geduldig.91 The
Court noted that "[t]he legislative history of Title VII's prohibition
of sex discrimination is notable primarily for its brevity."92 The
Court capitalized on the prevailing view that Congress included
sex as a prohibited category of the Civil Rights Act in an attempt
to defeat the bill.93
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
85. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
86. Id.
87. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1971).
88. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 149-50.
89. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute,
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, as recognized in AT&T
Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009).
90. Id. at 136 ("Geduldig is precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of
pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a
gender-based discrimination at all.").
91. Id.
92. Id. at 143.
93. Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880-83 (1966) (discussing the intention of
the amendment's author to kill the bill by adding sex); see also Gene Ann Roelofs,
Sex Discrimination and Insurance Planning: The Rights of Pregnant Men and
Women Under General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 22 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 101, 106 n.38
(1978) (noting the 'levity" with which the amendment to add sex to Title VII was
brought). But see Freeman, supra note 59, at 164-65 (discussing the active work of
feminists to add sex to the list of prohibited categories). Freeman notes that on the
day sex was added to the bill, nineteen other amendments were voted on, and the
20101
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Justice Brennan dissented and challenged the majority's
assertion that classifications based on pregnancy are, in fact, sex-
neutral.94 Since a plaintiff in a Title VII case could prevail if a
practice had a disparate impact, 95 he argued that the analysis
must be more rigorous and should look at the effects of the
categorization, not just the intent.96 To Justice Brennan, the
notable distinction was that the plan had "an adverse impact on
women ... [since it] insure[d] all risks except a commonplace one
that is applicable to women but not men."9 7 He believed the issue
revolved around comprehensive coverage because the plan offered
such coverage to men and not women, thereby demonstrating
disparate impact. 98 Therefore, even if the plan was categorically
sex-neutral, the plaintiffs, in demonstrating a prima facie violation
of Title VII based on the effects of the plan, were entitled to a more
rigorous analysis to determine if the policy "was actually the
product of neutral, persuasive actuarial considerations, or rather
stemmed from a policy that purposefully downgraded women's role
in the labor force."99
In essence, Justice Brennan acknowledged the doctrinal
shortfall of the equality-based focus on sex discrimination
legislation. 10 0 To Justice Brennan, since the goal of the Title VII
was to promote the equality of women, the relevant inquiry was
whether the classification negatively impacted women.10 '
Justice Stevens also dissented, noting that there was no need
to undergo disparate impact analysis since the statutory language
clearly required a finding of disparate treatment. 10 2  Justice
Stevens rejected the notion that a pregnancy classification was
neutral since "it is the capacity to become pregnant which
primarily differentiates the female from the male."'1 3 Since the
largest vote tally was for the sex amendment, indicating that several dozen
Representatives were available to support the amendment who were not present to
vote on others. Id. This betrays the general logic that Congress added sex to the
legislation as an afterthought. Id.
94. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
96. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 81-
88 and accompanying text.
97. Id. at 155.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 149.
100. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
101. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe resulting pattern
of risks insured by General Electric can then be evaluated in terms of the broad
social objectives promoted by Title VII.").
102. Id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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plan separated women from men in this way, there was
discrimination on the basis of sex "by definition." 10 4
IV. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
The congressional response to the Gilbert decision was a clear
repudiation of the logic that pregnancy classifications were sex-
neutral. The opening remarks for the introduction of the bill in
both houses of Congress, as well as both the Senate and House
conference reports, all mention the Gilbert decision. 10 5 Congress
passed the PDA to correct the "serious setback to women's rights
and to the development of antidiscrimination law under title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964."106
Congress specifically endorsed the dissenting opinions of
Justices Brennan and Stevens.1° 7 In particular, Congress noted
that the real intent of the Civil Rights Act was to make workplace
policies that disadvantaged women impermissible. 08 As a result,
Congress amended Title VII to include subsection k, which defines
the phrases "on the basis of sex" and "because of sex" in the
original language of Title VII to include employment decisions
made on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions... ."109 To deal with the "doctrinal embarrassment"'1 0
posed by equality-based sex discrimination logic around
pregnancy, Congress mandated that pregnancy classifications
were sex discrimination, and therefore courts must evaluate them
under disparate treatment jurisprudence and not disparate
impact."' As a result, pregnancy distinctions can only survive if
they are a BFOQ.112
Congress adopted a disability model for analyzing pregnancy
as a form of illness that impacted a woman's ability or inability to
104. Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. 123 CONG. REC. 4137-45 (1977) (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF
1978, at 1 (1980) [hereinafter PDA LEG. HISTORY]; 123 CONG. REC. 2120-21 (1977)
(introductory remarks of Rep. Hawkins), reprinted in PDA LEG. HIST. at 11; S. REP.
NO. 95-331, at 2 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978).
106. 123 CONG. REC. 4137-45 (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted
in PDA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 105, at 1.
107. S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 2; H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 2.
108. 123 CONG. REC. 4137-45 (introductory remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted
in PDA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 105, at 3.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
110. MacKinnon, supra note 62, at 82.
111. See supra notes 65, 85-88 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 82.
2010]
Law and Inequality
work. 113  In searching for a comparison, then, courts should
compare pregnant women with men who have a short-term
disability. While this framework easily fit for pregnancy-related
disabilities such as gestational diabetes, feminists at the time
were divided on whether a disability model was an appropriate
framework in which to consider pregnancy."14 The fact that
pregnancy is not a disability, but rather a condition unique to
women, led feminists to argue that framing pregnancy as a
disability was adopting men as the norm to which women must
conform in seeking legal protections.115
Regardless of these shortfalls, the PDA represented
Congressional acceptance of Justice Brennan's articulation that
pregnancy discrimination caused much of the subordination of
women in the labor force. "[P]regnancy exclusions built into
disability programs both financially burden women workers and
act to break down the continuity of the employment relationship,
thereby exacerbating women's comparatively transient role in the
labor force."116 The primary focus of the legislation was to move
away from pronatalism and towards the dominance approach that
more and more feminists advocated. 117 However, feminists were
concerned that extending more benefits to pregnant women would
create disincentives to hire women which, though illegal, would be
difficult to police and therefore create greater disadvantages for
women workers."18
V. Sex Discrimination After the PDA
While the PDA did not displace the constitutional treatment
of pregnancy as a categorization not requiring heightened
scrutiny, it dramatically changed the examination of pregnancy
exclusions challenged at the statutory level. After Congress
enacted the PDA, the Supreme Court acknowledged pregnancy
exclusions as outright discrimination and began approaching
113. Id.
114. SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, IN PURSUIT OF EQUALITY: WOMEN, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 122 (1992) ("While the subject of dispute in the early
cases had been over whether pregnant women at work should be treated
differently-and worse-than men at work, the question now was whether
pregnant women could (and should) be treated differently-and better-than
men.").
115. CHAMALLAS, supra note 48, at 44-45.
116. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 158 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, as
recognized in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009).
117. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
118. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 155.
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women's subordination from the dominance approach advocated by
feminists. 1 9
A. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC12 0
In one of its first opportunities to interpret the new
legislation, the Supreme Court addressed whether employers could
exclude pregnancy coverage from employee health plans for the
wives of their male employees. 121 The Court held that "Congress,
by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act... rejected the test
of discrimination employed by the Court in [Gilbert]." 22  The
Court expressly adopted the dissenting opinions in Gilbert, that
the appropriate classification to examine was not "pregnant
women and non-pregnant persons,"123 but rather "persons who face
a risk of pregnancy and those who do not."124 The Court
determined that Congress had made it clear that "discrimination
based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination
because of her sex."'125  Therefore, a plan that offered less
comprehensive protection to one sex than the other was
unlawful. 126
B. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.127
The Supreme Court then addressed so-called "fetal-protection
policies" at a battery factory that excluded women from jobs
handling lead,1 28 holding that such a policy was "not neutral
because it [did] not apply to the reproductive capacity of the
company's male employees in the same way as it applie[d] to that
of the females."'129 The Court also clarified that a policy based on
pregnancy would have to pass muster under the BFOQ exception
of disparate treatment, and not the business necessity defense of
disparate impact jurisprudence. 130 The Court's opinion was a clear
acknowledgement that the discrimination analysis of pregnancy
119. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
120. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
121. Id. at 671.
122. Id. at 676.
123. Id. at 678 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
124. Id. (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
125. Id. at 684.
126. Id. at 676.
127. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
128. Id. at 197.
129. Id. at 199.
130. Id. at 199-200; see also supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
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must go beyond the equality approach, which allows different
treatment based on biological differences, to a dominance
approach, which looks critically at policies that undermine the role
of women in the workforce.1 31
C. California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra132
In its next pregnancy case, the Supreme Court firmly
validated that the dominance approach to women's role in the
work force was the appropriate way to evaluate pregnancy
distinctions. 133 The Court evaluated a California law that gave
pregnant women more rights when returning to work from
pregnancy than men returning from disability leave. 34 The Court
determined that the PDA created a floor below which pregnancy
benefits could not fall, but it did not prevent states from passing
legislation offering pregnant women greater benefits. 135 The Court
recognized that Congress "saw pregnancy as an integral moment
in women's working lives, and was committed to eliminating
employment practices that cast them in conflict."'136 In so ruling,
the Court again indicated that the dominance approach to sex
discrimination-where the relevant question is how a practice
impacts the ability of women to participate in the labor force-is
the appropriate way to interpret the legislation.
VI. Infertility and the PDA
Congress did not articulate a standard for evaluating
infertility in its discussion of the PDA. In part, this omission is
likely due to timing. The first TVF child was born in 1981,137 three
years after Congress passed the PDA. Given the contemporaneous
debates surrounding a woman's right to abortion and the feminist
movement, it is also hardly surprising that the focus of Congress
was on mitigating the negative effects of pregnancy-wanted or
131. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 155.
132. 479 U.S. 272.
133. Id. at 286-89; see also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (describing
the dominance approach).
134. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 275-76.
135. Id. at 285.
136. Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 939 (1985). The Court specifically noted that the
PDA was enacted to "guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and
equally in the work force, without denying them the fundamental right to full
participation in family life."' Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289 (quoting 123 CONG. REC.
29,658 (1977)).
137. MUNDY, supra note 10, at 29.
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unwanted-for working women, and not on issues of infertility.
Additionally, the influx of women into the professional
workforce 138 may have contributed to the rising demand for
fertility treatments139 due to the impact of advanced age on
fertility.140 This demand would not have been evident at the time
Congress passed the PDA.
In determining whether the PDA forbids infertility
exclusions, courts should follow the approach intended by
Congress and enforced by the Supreme Court. This dominance
approach calls upon the judiciary to examine whether "a policy
[related to pregnancy] ... purposefully downgrade[s] women's role
in the labor force.'1'
Courts are not always adept at this analysis. For example,
the Eighth Circuit held that denial of coverage for contraception in
an employer's health plan does not implicate the PDA since
"contraception is a treatment that is only indicated prior to
pregnancy."142 For the Eighth Circuit, the fact that "contraception
may certainly affect the causal chain that leads to pregnancy" was
not sufficient to bring it within the purview of the PDA.' 43 A
Washington district court previously held the opposite, finding
that the lack of coverage for contraceptives left women exposed to
a risk to which men were not exposed,1 44 thereby violating the
comprehensive coverage standard articulated in Newport News. 145
The Eighth Circuit's focus on the temporal link of contraception to
pregnancy falls short of the congressional mandate to determine if
the practice undermines women's role in the labor force.1 46
Unplanned and unwanted pregnancy caused by a lack of
contraception certainly has this effect, since it forces women out of
138. George Gilder, Women in the Work Force, ATLANTIC, Sept. 1986, at 20
("From 1890 to 1985 the participation in the work force of women between the ages
of twenty-five and forty-four soared from 15 to 71 percent, with the pace of change
tripling after 1950.").
139. MUNDY, supra note 10, at 12.
140. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 3.
141. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 149 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, as
recognized in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009).
142. In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th
Cir. 2007).
143. Id. at 941.
144. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270-72 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
145. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676
(1983) (noting that, to be sufficient under the PDA, the insurance coverage of men
and women must be equally comprehensive).
146. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the labor market, thereby disrupting their careers.
Until the recent decision in Hall v. Nalco Co.,' 4 7 courts were
unanimous in finding that infertility was not a protected condition
under the PDA.148 In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,149
the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to an employer who denied health insurance coverage
for ART to an otherwise covered employee. 150 The court relied on a
rule of statutory construction to hold that since the general phrase
"related medical conditions" in the PDA followed the specific terms
of "pregnancy" and "childbirth," the PDA should not be read to
include conditions outside of the context of those terms.151 Since
infertility prevents conception and therefore pregnancy, the
statute did not protect it.152 The court also found that the lack of
mention of infertility in the legislative history was persuasive. 153
The court additionally held that, since the lack of coverage applied
to both male and female infertility, the policy was gender
neutral. 154
In Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,155 the Second Circuit upheld a
district court's grant of summary judgment to an employer whose
health insurance coverage did not include ART.156 To the Second
Circuit, the test of sex discrimination under the PDA was
"whether sex-specific conditions exist, and if so, whether exclusion
of benefits for those conditions results in a plan that provides
inferior coverage to one sex."'157 While noting that the "related
medical conditions" language of the PDA clearly embraced more
than just pregnancy, 158 the Second Circuit held that a "condition
must be unique to women" to fall under the protection of the
147. 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
148. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 343 (2nd Cir. 2003);
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1996).
149. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
150. Id. at 676. The employee in Krauel was diagnosed with endometriosis
which was treated by her doctor and covered under her employee healtlrinsurance.
Id. at 675-76. After continued infertility, Krauel received GIFT. Id. at 676. After
three cycles of GIFT, Krauel became pregnant and delivered a baby girl. Id. Her
health insurance covered the pregnancy and delivery expenses but not those for the
GIFT. Id. See supra note 33 for a description of GIFT.
151. Id. at 679.
152. Id. at 679-80.
153. Id. at 679.
154. Id. at 680.
155. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2nd Cir. 2003).
156. Id. at 343. For a description of IVF procedures, see supra note 33.
157. Id. at 344.
158. Id. at 345.
[Vol. 28:163
Infertile Grounds
PDA.159 Since infertility affects both men and women with equal
frequency, "inferior coverage for infertility... [does] not violate
the PDA."160 The court, however, reserved the question of whether
a woman who received adverse employment action for taking sick
days to undergo surgical implantation procedures would be able to
state a claim.16 1
While the courts in Krauel and Saks reached the right
conclusions regarding infertility exclusions, their reasoning
incorrectly focused on whether men and women occupy different
categories with regard to infertility, such that infertility exclusions
operate in the same manner as pregnancy exclusions. 162 These
courts correctly evaluated whether men and women receive
comprehensive coverage as articulated by Congress, 163 but failed to
analyze the nature of these polices on the subjugation of women in
the labor force, as this Article advocates. In analyzing such
exclusions, the proper test is to move beyond binary
categorizations as implicated by the equality model. The question
should be whether the policy acts to disrupt women's careers and
cause their increased subordination in the labor market.
The most recent decision regarding infertility exclusions,
Hall v. Nalco Co.,164 reached the wrong conclusion as a result of
this failure to analyze infertility exclusions under the dominance
approach. The court reviewed a district court's grant of summary
judgment to an employer who fired an employee for taking time off
to undergo IVF. 65 The Seventh Circuit held that "Hall was
terminated not for the gender-neutral condition of infertility, but
rather for the gender-specific quality of childbearing capacity."1 66
Based on Justice Stevens' dissent in Gilbert, as articulated in
Johnson Controls, the court wrongly determined that the policy
was disparate treatment such that Hall had stated "a cognizable
claim of sex discrimination under Title VII."167 This analysis,
however, was incorrect.
The PDA clearly articulates that pregnancy exclusions are
not gender-neutral, and as such, disparate treatment
159. Id. at 346.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 346 n.4.
162. See id. at 345-46; Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680-81
(8th Cir. 1996).
163. See Saks, 316 F.3d at 346-49; Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679-80.
164. 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
165. Id. at 645.




jurisprudence, not disparate impact, is implicated. 168 Therefore, if
infertility is a related medical condition under the PDA, it is
disparate treatment and must withstand the BFOQ standard to
survive.169 It is unlikely that an employer could successfully argue
that fertility is a BFOQ except for a position as a sperm donor or a
surrogate. Under disparate impact theory, however, the
appropriate inquiry turns on whether such an impact reinforces
the subjugation of women in the labor market-the dominance
approach. 170
A. Infertility Exclusions do not Constitute Disparate
Treatment
Courts consider a policy that is facially discriminatory
disparate treatment. 171 However, infertility is not sex-specific. 172
Both men and women can be infertile, and the treatments are the
same-ART. 173 The Hall court found disparate treatment because
"[e]mployees terminated for taking time off to undergo IVF-just
like those terminated for taking time off to... receive other
pregnancy-related care-will always be women.1 74 However, time
off for medical procedures is not sex specific. A company with a
policy that individuals can take time off for every procedure but
IVF may fall afoul of a gendered line, but even in the case of Ms.
Hall, she was allowed time off for IVF once. 175 Congress has
enacted limits in all manner of time-off provisions, 176 such that a
court can fairly interpret limits to the amount of time an employer
must give an employee for medical treatment. Furthermore, an
infertility exclusion is not based on the "capacity to become
pregnant"'177 since an infertile woman, by definition, does not
168. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
170. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 149-50, 155 (describing disparate impact and
the dominance approach).
171. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 149-50.
172. MUNDY, supra note 10, at 10.
173. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 306, 313 (discussing IVF as a treatment
for both male and female infertility problems).
174. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2008).
175. Id. at 645-46.
176. For example, the Family Medical Leave Act only requires that employers
give twelve weeks of leave in a calendar year to an employee to deal with major
medical issues. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006). Additionally, in discussing the amount of
time involved in accommodating pregnant women, Congress understood it to be a
finite amount of time. S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 4 (1977) ("Since the period of
disability for a normal pregnancy is 4-8 weeks, benefits will normally be paid only
for that period.").
177. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
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possess the capacity to become pregnant. Therefore, it is not clear
that exclusions on the basis of infertility are, on their face,
impermissible sex classifications.
B. Infertility Exclusions May Cause a Disparate Impact on
Women
A practice that has a disparate impact on women can also be
an impermissible sex classification. 178 Such a disparate impact is
present if the practice operates to deny women equal employment
opportunities and foster stratified job environments that
disadvantage women. 179  In such a determination, the social
context of working women and employment practices that have
"exacerbate[d] women's comparatively transient role in the labor
force . . ."180 are relevant. The first determination, then, is
whether infertility exclusions primarily impact women. 181
1. Infertility Exclusions Can Primarily Impact
Women
The research on infertility suggests that infertility equally
afflicts men and women.18 2 These findings imply that if employers
exclude all fertility coverage from benefit plans, men and women
would be equally impacted. The argument that women are more
negatively impacted by an inability to have children and hence
suffer disproportionately18 3 is difficult to reconcile with the history
of employment discrimination based on maintaining women's
stereotypical role in the family.18 4 As the Supreme Court has
noted, a practice "based on... stereotypical assumptions would, of
course, be inconsistent with Title VII's goal of equal employment
superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, as
recognized in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009).
178. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 148-50 (discussing the Supreme Court's
expanded definition of discrimination in Title VII as prohibiting disparate impact).
179. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 158.
181. Id. at 155.
182. MUNDY, supra note 10, at 10.
183. Brietta R. Clark, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.: A Roadmap for Gender
Equality in Reproductive Health Care or An Empty Promise?, 23 LAW & INEQ. 299,
323 (2005) ("Both men and women who have suffered through this process [of
infertility] have testified to the unique and particularly isolating pain that women
suffer, due in part to the reality that for many women, their self-image and
society's image of them is strongly tied to the ability to have a child.").
184. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that
employment policies are not created in a social vacuum and must be evaluated in
light of prevailing "stereotypes and signals").
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opportunity."'' 8 5  It would be illogical to find employment
discrimination in policies that consider women primary
caregivers-and hence, transient workers-while at the same time
determining that an inability to bear children creates a
disproportionate burden on women, since they rely on this
stereotype for their positive self-image. This faulty reasoning
asserts that the same social context that disadvantages women for
their childbearing capacity would provide justification for finding
disadvantage if they did not in fact have that childbearing
capacity.186
Since many insurance plans cover lower level infertility
interventions under other provisions,18 7 the more relevant
question is whether exclusions for ART have a greater impact on
women than men. Certainly IVF is a costly venture. 8 8 However,
IVF is a treatment not just for unexplained female infertility, but
also for male infertility, 8 9 suggesting that the costs would be
equally born by men and women if not covered by insurance.
Determining the appropriate correlative treatment for men whose
infertility is not resolved from IVF, however, indicates that costs
may be more difficult to compare. While IVF can resolve a
woman's underlying infertility, sperm donations-ranging from
$300 to $85019°-do not address men's underlying fertility issues
after circumventing them. 19 1
Even if adequate medical interventions for male infertility
existed, the ability to contribute sperm to a pregnancy is only a
part of the equation. A woman with a viable egg and uterus only
needs sperm to help her have a child. A man with viable sperm,
on the other hand, needs the donation of an egg and a viable
uterus. 192 In equating men's and women's infertility, the actual
185. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987).
186. See supra notes 186-189 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 2003)
(noting that Franklin Covey's health insurance plan allowed employees to "claim
benefits for a variety of infertility products and procedures, such as ovulation kits,
oral fertility drugs, penile prosthetic implants ... and nearly all surgical infertility
treatments."). In the case of unexplained infertility, however, the treatment aims
to achieve pregnancy without removing the underlying cause of the infertility.
BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 302.
188. Monahan, supra note 35, at 160 (noting that the average cost of just one
cycle of IVF is between $10,000 and $15,000).
189. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 313.
190. Collura, supra note 34.
191. BALEN & JACOBS, supra note 11, at 273.
192. See SHERRY F. COLB, WHEN SEX COUNTS: MAKING BABIES AND MAKING
LAW, 62-66 (2007). Colb notes that the discussion of parentage as only being about
the equal contribution of DNA by men and women "dismiss[es] as irrelevant the
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cost of addressing men's infertility needs to be determined. 193 In
the end, therefore, it is not clear that infertility exclusions from
insurance coverage have a disproportionate impact on women in
terms of cost.
Cost is not the only factor to evaluate when determining if
infertility exclusions disproportionately burden women workers.
Arguably, women undergoing ART may need more time away from
work to achieve pregnancy than men. This is the precise nature of
the claim in Hall. As the court noted, "[e]ach IVF treatment takes
weeks to complete, and multiple treatments are sometimes needed
to achieve a successful pregnancy." 194 In this regard, the time off
work necessary for women to receive fertility treatments relative
to men may have a greater impact on women than on men.195
2. Infertility Exclusions Do Not Negatively Impact
Women's Role in the Labor Force
A plaintiffs ability to show that infertility exclusions have a
differential impact on women as compared to men, however, is not
the end of a disparate impact analysis. A disparate impact
showing is only a violation of Title VII if there is a correlative
"exacerbat[ion of] women's comparatively transient role in the
labor force."'196 If such an impact "downgrade[s] women's role in
the labor force" then the policy is impermissible.197
Denying a woman time off for ART does not negatively
impact her role in the workforce. Unlike pregnancy, where a
pregnant woman has no options-other than an abortion-to
choose work over family, in the case of ART a woman is making
the choice to undergo timely and expensive treatments to attempt
to conceive. While it may be a legitimate personal choice, to expect
an employer to pay for this choice goes beyond the PDA's goal of
minimizing the disruptions to women's role in the labor force. 198
Finally, insurance coverage of ART encourages pronatalist
unique (and clearly essential) contribution that women make" of carrying a child to
term. Id.
193. This is as opposed to simply relying on donor sperm.
194. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2008).
195. However, given the availability of twelve weeks of leave through the Family
Medical Leave Act, it is not clear that this impact is very large or widespread. 29
U.S.C. § 2612 (2006).
196. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 158 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, as
recognized in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009).
197. Id. at 149.
198. See supra Part IV.
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attitudes' 99 that not only hearken back to the ideology of separate
spheres, 200 but also may distort labor market opportunities for
women, as employers (illegally) try to avoid these costs by not
hiring women.20 1 Coverage of ART increases the utilization of
such techniques,202 thereby increasing the disruption to women's
careers. Further, it decreases the incentive for employees to
demand truly family-friendly work policies since women are lured
into thinking they can almost indefinitely delay childbearing.
Justice Brennan captured this tension between work and
family in his Gilbert dissent when he dismissed the
characterization of pregnancy as a purely voluntary event. 20 3
Justice Brennan rejected arguments that the voluntariness of
pregnancy permitted its exclusion from General Electric's
disability plan, since all pregnancies were not voluntary and the
plan covered other voluntary disabilities.20 4 Congress similarly
treated the "proposition that pregnancy is a voluntary condition
[a]s overbroad"205 by considering facts about unplanned pregnancy
in their deliberations. 206 The choice to undergo ART, however, is
voluntary, making repetitive bouts of missed work more
burdensome to employers and not necessarily something Congress
would find compelling to require. 20 7 Therefore, while the effects of
time-off provisions for infertility may be different for women and
men, it is not a difference that Congress sought to repair as a
"desired end product[] of the relevant legislati[on. '"208
Furthermore, Justice Brennan distinguished between policies
based on "neutral, persuasive actuarial considerations" and those
that "stemmed from a policy that purposefully downgraded
women's role in the labor force." 209  The implication is that
employers can take actuarial considerations into account when
199. HARWOOD, supra note 2, at 102.
200. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
201. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 155.
202. See supra notes 45-46.
203. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 151 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 151.
205. Id.
206. FACT SHEET ON S. 995, reprinted in PDA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 105, at
21 (noting that a large percentage of pregnancies are not voluntary or planned).
207. For example, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the expectation of
reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities is tempered by the ability of
employers to demonstrate an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006). Two of the
factors of an undue burden are cost and financial resources of the employer. Id.
208. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 149.
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designing workplace policies, 210 so long as they are not byproducts
of policies intended to negatively affect women's role in the labor
force.
Finally, the Hall court's determination removes the
employment decision from its context in a way that alters the
logic. Followed to its conclusion, it subverts the stated intent of
the PDA. An employer like Johnson Controls could not bar women
from taking jobs that make them infertile 21 1 and would also be
barred from denying them time off or insurance coverage to treat
their infertility. In essence, then, an employer could become
strictly liable for a woman's infertility. The only way to avoid this
strict liability would be for employers to offer no insurance benefits
or time off for disabilities to any employees, 212 or to illegally
discriminate against women by not hiring them.213 Given the
positive impact of leave policies on the ability of women to
participate in the labor force, this is an absurd result and certainly
not one desired by Congress. The option to avoid hiring women
needs no further comment.
Conclusion
Congress' intent in passing the PDA was to protect women
from "the sex stereotyping [about pregnancy that results] in
unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace."21 4
Equality of women in the labor force, with respect for the
"commonsense" understanding that women have the responsibility
and burden of bearing children, was the goal. 215 Encouraging
pronatalist policies was not.
Interpreting the PDA to mandate infertility coverage would
not further these policy goals for other reasons. While it is not
certain that insurance coverage for ART encourages women to
delay childbearing to pursue careers, 21 6 the potential for such a
moral hazard exists.21 7  Furthermore, some feminists see
210. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
211. UAW. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991).
212. S. REP. No. 95-331, at 5 (1977) ("[S]ince the basic standard is comparability
among employees, an employer who does not provide medical benefits at all would
not have to pay the medical costs of pregnancy or childbirth.").
213. KENNEY, supra note 67, at 155.
214. S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 3.
215. Id.
216. HARWOOD, supra note 2, at 4, 100.
217. EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 335. Epstein argues that disability coverage for
pregnancy will encourage women to become pregnant; however, the idea that such
a moral hazard would operate in terms of covering pregnancy was specifically
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infertility technologies as "reinforcing women's oppression, giving
scientific and therapeutic support to the patriarchal presumption
that reproduction is a woman's prime commodity." 21  The
existence of reproductive technology creates the illusion that
women can delay childbirth almost indefinitely. 219 This illusion, in
turn, diminishes the pressure on businesses to more "adequately
accommodate the reality of childbearing and child rearing as a fact
of human existence-for example, through high-quality and
accessible child care, paid parenting leave for mothers and fathers,
and/or part-time work for one or both parents with benefits and
without penalty."220 For these reasons, it is clear that increasing
the demand and market for ART actually increases women's
subordination in the workplace.
In the end, Title VII and the PDA, as statutes concerned with
preventing workplace discrimination on the basis of sex, are
limited vehicles for women attempting to expand employer
coverage for infertility. In the constitutional context, parenthood
is generally not considered a fundamental right.221 In the case of
infertility, when a woman has yet to carry and birth a child, it is
difficult to argue that a woman has a fundamental right to be a
parent without invoking the same stereotypes about women as
mothers that are at the root of employment discrimination in the
first place. 222 The Supreme Court more recently approved federal
prophylactic legislation to deter discrimination on the basis of
these stereotypes, 223 indicating that they may be unlikely to
repudiated by the case law and Congress. Id. In the context of insurance coverage
for ART, it is more plausible that infertile women, desperate for some hope of
pregnancy, will utilize the benefit beyond the point of social benefit. This
desperation is already evident even without mandated insurance. "[For many
women] the quest to conceive becomes an endless, bottomless demand, driving
them in many cases to pay whatever they can: to take out a second mortgage, wipe
out their savings, or give up a lucrative job." SPAR, supra note 12, at 32.
218. HARWOOD, supra note 2, at 21 (citing Anne Donchin, Feminist Critiques of
New Fertility Technologies: Implications for Social Policy, 21 J. OF MED. & PHIL.
475, 475-76 (1996)).
219. The illusion is based on the perception that ART is universally effective.
Studies show that age impacts fertility treatments in the same way that it impacts
fertility. Forty-year-old women using IVF have a twenty-five percent chance of
becoming pregnant. The chance diminishes to ten percent at age forty-three and
zero percent at age forty-six. See SPAR, supra note 12, at 42.
220. HARWOOD, supra note 2, at 4.
221. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (holding that a natural
father does not possess a fundamental right to be a parent that supersedes the
state's interest in supporting a marriage).
222. See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
223. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 722 (2003) (finding the
Family Medical Leave Act constitutional since it worked to remedy discrimination
based on stereotypes "unsuccessfully" addressed by the PDA).
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approve policies that perpetuate those same stereotypes. In the
end, the Americans with Disabilities Act may be a better vehicle
for women to use to earn benefits for infertility, since the most
recent amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act
included "reproductive functions" as a major life activity for
determining whether a disability exists. 224 Such an approach
would allow employers to openly address cost concerns as an
undue burden without illegally avoiding hiring women. Under
Title VII, however, employer classifications based on infertility do
not rise to the level of illegal discrimination, and to hold otherwise
does a great disservice to the advances of women in the workforce
in the last thirty years.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(b) (2006) ("For purposes of [defining disability], a
major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including
... reproductive functions.").
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